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INTRODUCTION
The STS-60 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload
activities as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster
(SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine
(SSME) systems performance during the sixtieth flight of the Space Shuttle
Program and eighteenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Discovery (OV-I03). In
addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET designated at
ET-61 (Block I0); three SSME's which were designated as serial numbers 2012,
2034, and 2032 in positions I, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were
designated BI-062. The RSRMs that were installed in each SRB were designated as
360LO35A (lightweight) for the left SRB, and 3600035B (quarterweight) for the
right SRB.
This STS-60 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle
Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E. That
document requires that each major organizational element supporting the Program
report the results of their hardware evaluation and mission performance plus
identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objectives of the STS-60 mission were to deploy and retrieve the
Wake Shield Facility-I (WSF-1), and to activate the Spacehab-2 payload and
perform on-orbit experiments. Secondary objectives of this flight were to
activate and command the Capillary Pumped Loop/Orbital Debris Radar Calibration
Spheres/Breman Satellite Experiment/Getaway Special (GAS) Bridge Assembly
(CAPL/ODERACS/BREMSAT/GBA) payload, the Auroral Photography Experiment-B
(APE-B), and the Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II (SAREX-II).
The STS-60 mission was planned as a nominal eight-day mission with two
contingency days available should Orbiter contingency operations or weather
avoidance be required. The sequence of events for the STS-60 mission is shown
in Table I. The official Orbiter Project Office Problem Tracking List is shown
in Table II. The official Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Problem Tracking
List is shown in Table III, and the official MSFC Problem Tracking List is shown
in Table IV. In addition, the Integration and Payload in-flight anomalies are
referenced in the applicable sections of the report. Appendix A lists the
sources of data, both formal and informal, that were used in the preparation of
this document. Appendix B provides the definition of acronyms and abbreviations
used in this document. All times are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) as
well as mission elapsed time (MET).
The six-person crew for this sixtieth flight of the Space Shuttle Program
consisted of Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Col., U. S. Marine Corps, Commander;
Kenneth S. Reightler, Jr., Capt. U. S. Navy, Pilot; N. Jan Davis, Ph.D.,
Civilian, Mission Specialist l; Ronald M. Sega, Ph.D., Civilian, Mission
Specialist 2; Franklin R. Chang-Diaz, Ph.D. Civilian, Mission Specialist 3; and
Sergei Konstantinovich Krikalev, Civilian and Russian Cosmonaut, Mission
Specialist 4. STS-60 was the fourth space flight for the Pilot and Mission
Specialist 3, the second space flight for the Pilot and Mission Specialist I;
the first space flight for Mission Specialist 2; and the first U. S. space
flight for Mission Specialist 4; however, Mission Specialist 4 has flown on two
Soyuz/Mir missions.
MISSION SUMMARY
The countdown for the STS-60 launch was completed with no unplanned holds, and
this resulted in an on-time launch on a 57-degree inclination at
034:12:10:00.000 G.m.t. (7:10 a.m.e.s.t.) on February 3, 1994, from launch
complex 39A. Evaluation showed that all SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred
as expected, and the launch phase performance was satisfactory in all respects.
SRB separation, entry, deceleration, and water impact occurred as anticipated
with no anomalies noted. Performance of the SSMEs, ET, and main propulsion
system (MPS) was nominal. A determination of overall vehicle performance during
ascent was made using vehicle acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction
data. From these data, the average flight-derived engine Isp, as determined for
the time period between SRB separation and start of 3-g throttling, was
452.47 seconds as compared to an MPS tag value of 452.63 seconds.
As a result of the nominal ascent vehicle performance on the direct insertion
trajectory, no orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 1 maneuver was required. A
nominal OMS 2 maneuver was performed at 034:12:52:16 G.m.t. (00:O0:42:16 MET),
and all OMS parameters indicated normal subsystem performance. OMS 2 was
163.5 seconds in duration and imparted a differential velocity (_V) of
268.7 ft/sec. The orbit achieved as a result was 191.4 by 189.6 nmi.
The payload bay doors were opened by 034:13:41:20 G.m.t. (00:01:31:20 MET) in a
normal manner.
During Spacehab activation, a procedure which consisted of removing a diffuser
cap from the middeck floor air duct fitting and placing it on the tunnel adapter
floor fitting was to be performed. However, because of the lack of sufficient
clearance between the tunnel adapter floor fitting and the tunnel adapter floor,
nominal positioning of the diffuser cap could not be completed. The diffuser
cap was grey-taped into position and functioned as intended for the remainder of
the mission.
Major activities for flight day 3 included Wake Shield Facility (NSF) unberthing
and a subsequent reberthlng after the WSF deployment was waved off.
Difficulties were encountered commanding the WSF, and another deployment attempt
was performed on flight day 4.
Following the supply water dump at 036:09:44 G.m.t. (01:21:34 MET), I0 discrete
instances of supply-water dump-valve leakage were noted. The leakage occurred
over a 16-hour 33-minute period which included the time during which the NSF was
being maneuvered by the remote manipulator system (RMS). Following the
post-sleep activities on flight day 4, the crew purged the supply dump llne;
Subsequent supply water dumps were performed with the WSF berthed and were
followed by a supply water dump line purge. Similar leakage has been noted on
previous OV-103 flights (STS-48, STS-53, and STS-56). However, the leakage
occurrences on STS-60 were more numerous and encompassed a longer time period
than those experienced on previous flights.
The major activity for flight day 4 was a second attempt to deploy the WSF.
Problems were encountered with the WSF attitude control system and the
deployment was again waved off. The WSF remained attached to the end of the RMS
where many of its planned science operations were completed.
While the WSF remained on the RMS, excess supply water (95 ib) was transferred
to a contingency water container (CWC) at 037:22:31G.m.t. (03:10:21 MET). This
action was performed to prevent WSF contamination, which could occur during a
water dump.
The final berthing of the USF was completed at 040:12:18:27 G.m.t.
(06:00:08:27 MET). Also, deployment of six Orbital Debris Radar Calibration
Spheres (ODERACS) occurred at 040:14:53:24 G.m.t. (06:02:43:24 MET), and
deployment of the Bremen Satellite (BREMSAT) was completed at 040:19:23:17
G.m.t. (06:07:13:17 MET).
On flight day 8, the flight control system (FCS) checkout and the reaction
control subsystem (RCS) hot-fire test were performed with no anomalies noted.
Auxiliary power unit (APU) 1 ran for 6 minutes 8 seconds during the FCS
checkout, and all thrusters operated satisfactorily during the RCS hot-fire
test.
All stowage activities in preparation for entry were completed. The payload bay
doors were closed at 042:14:09:17 G.m.t. (08:01:59:17 MET) and latched at
042:14:10:30 G.m.t. (08:02:00:30 MET). Because the weather conditions at the
KSC Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) were unacceptable for landing operations, the
first landing opportunity was waived. However, the weather improved and
conditions were acceptable for landing on the second opportunity. The deorbit
maneuver was initiated at 042:18:14:50 G.m.t. (08:06:04:50 MET). The maneuver
was approximately 234.4 seconds in duration and the &V was 407.0 ft/sec. Entry
interface occurred at 042:18:47:51G.m.t. (08:06:37:51 MET).
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at the SLF on concrete runway 15 at
042:19:19:22 G.m.t. (08:07:09:22 MET) on February ll, 1994. The Orbiter drag
chute was deployed satisfactorily at O42:19:19:32.5 G.m.t., and nose landing
gear touchdown occurred 9.5 seconds after drag chute deployment. The drag chute
was jettisoned at 042:19:19:54.9 G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at
042:19:20:13 G.m.t. Indications are that the rollout was normal in all
respects. The flight duration was 08 days 07 hours 09 minutes 22 seconds. All
three APU's were powered down by 042:19:35:38.80 G.m.t. The crew completed the
required postflight reconfigurations and departed the Orbiter landing area.
PAYLOADS
SPACEHAB SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
The Spacehab Flight Unit-2 Module and its systems exhibited the same
near-flawless performance on STS-60 as Flight Unit-I demonstrated on STS-57.
There were no Spacehab Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) violations during the
countdown, and performance of the Spacehab was nominal throughout the launch
phase.
During Spacehab activation, a procedure which consisted of removing a diffuser
cap from the middeck floor air duct fitting and placing it on the tunnel adapter
floor fitting was to be performed. However, because of the lack of sufficient
clearance between the tunnel adapter floor fitting and the tunnel adapter floor,
nominal positioning of the diffuser cap could not be completed (Flight Problem
STS-60-V-O1). The diffuser cap was grey-taped into position and functioned
as intended for the remainder of the mission.
During activation, a cross-talk problem was noted between the
intercommunications loops and the Spacehab caution and warning system that was
heard on the air-to-ground communications. This problem is discussed in the
Communications and Tracking section of this report.
The Spacehab module interior temperature was more closely controlled on this
mission, and the crew was kept more comfortable throughout the flight.
Calibration of the thermal control system after STS-57 allowed the active
control of module interior temperature on STS-60 by controlled mixing of the hot
and cold water upstream of the module heat exchangers. Performance of the
thermal control system components was nominal during the mission.
The only significant problem that affected Spacehab systems occurred on flight
day 3 when the flight crew noted that the flexible rubber duct connecting the
Orbiter environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) supply line to the
Spacehab floor fitting was partially collapsed. Subsequent troubleshooting
identified the cause as blockage of the Spacehab atmospheric revitalization
system (ARS) fan inlet debris screen in the fan inlet muffler. This blockage
increased the suction in the ECLSS supply line and collapsed the duct. An
in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure was successfully performed on flight day 4
to clean the debris screen and reinforce the flexible duct by inserting a flight
data file cover (plastic) inside the flexible duct, The Spacehab ARS fan
performance was restored to nominal levels. The module electrical power and
command and data systems performed nominally throughout the mission with no
anomalies or evidence of performance degradation noted.
SCIENTIFIC RESULTS OF SPACEHAB EXPERIMENTS.
Astroculture-3
Performance of the Astroculture (ASC-3) plant growth system was nearly perfect.
Some scientific parameters were downlinked through the portable audio data modem
(PADH). Final results will be determined through postflight hardware and data
analysis. Results of this experiment will be published in separate
documentation.
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Bioserve Pilot Laborator 7
The Bioserve Pilot Laboratory (BPL) processed perfectly all but one of the
bioprocessing modules (BPMs). Upon activation of that one BPM, the crew noticed
a drop of fluid in the vicinity of the sample valve. The BPM, which was already
double-bagged for containment, was stowed immediately, according to the plan.
Subsequent to the mission, the fluid at the valve was determined to have been
residual water from a preflight leak check of the BPM. The BPL experiment
results will be determined through postflight analysis of all BPMs, and these
results will be reported in separate documentation.
Commercial Generic Bioprocessin_ Apparatus
The Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA) system performed well with
no significant anomalies. The monitoring time for one of the group activation
packs (GAPs) was reduced, consequently, a small amount (I - 2 percent) of
science results were lost.
Commercial Protein CrTstal Growth
The commercial protein crystal growth (CPCG) experiment hardware operated
satisfactorily. The crew reported detection of the beginning of nucleation
process on flight day 2. This was the first time that protein nucleation has
been detected in space. Because of a delay in reprogramming a temperature
profile, the Protein Crystal Facility Light Scattering Unit was paused overnight
and reprogrammed approximately 13 hours later. This 13-hour pause and
reprogramming resulted in a loss of visibility into the nucleation process.
However, later downlinked information confirmed the growth of human-insulin
crystals. After completion of sample inspection and other data analysis, the
results of this experiment will be published in a separate document.
Equipment for Controlled Liquid Phase Sinterin_ Experiment - Spacehab
The Equipment for Controlled Liquid Phase Sintering Experiment - Spacehab
(ECLIPSE - Hab) met all of its processing objectives, although a brief false-
start occurred because of a software discrepancy. Results will be published in
a separate document after all analysis and inspections are completed.
Immunolog7 Experiment-Of
The Immunology Experiment-Of (IMMUNE-OI) worked well and temperatures remained
within the expected band. All of the animals used in the experiment survived
the flight, and results of the experiment will be based on laboratory analysis.
The results of this experiment will be published in a separate document.
Organic Separation
The Organic Separation (ORSEP) facility experienced mechanical failure of both
sample transfer disks. This resulted in no activation of any of the experiments
within the ORSEP facility. The source of the failure was an incompatibility of
the sample fluids and sealing grease which resulted in the two rotating plates
bonding together. Additionally, there was a failure of the thermal control
system on one of the two transfer disks that, although not a safety hazard, did
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significantly compromise the viability of the experiment. There is an effort
underway at the experiment's homeinstitution to try to glean some science from
the flight, but no results have as yet been reported.
Pennsylvania State Biomodule
During the late access/installation, the failure of a circuit board in the
Pennsylvania State Biomodule (PSB) caused the loss of a status display panel.
Procedures were developed and implemented to allow the crew to control PSB "in
the blind" during the mission. However, postflight analysis revealed that the
biomodule failed to activate properly on-orbit, thereby minimizing science
return on this experiment.
Space Acceleration Measurement System
The Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS) hardware operation was
excellent. Only minor data losses occurred, and these were caused by late disk
changes.
Space Experiment Facility
The Space Experiment Facility (SEF) hardware worked well with no anomalies. Due
to the unavailability of onboard real-time TV downlink, the Principal
Investigator was unable to prevent spurious nucleation of the transparent
furnace "A" side semiconductor crystal growth. The "B" side semiconductor
crystal, however, appears to have grown exceptionally well and produced a
well-formed crystal. The SEF opaque furnace ran according to its pre-programmed
profile, and results (dependent on sample analysis) will be reported in separate
documentation.
Stirlin_ Orbiter Refrigerator/Freezer
The Stirling Orbiter Refrigerator/Freezer (SOR/F) performed satisfactorily.
Just before the planned switch to refrigerator mode, a small amount of frost in
an air duct caused a loss of cooling. Conversion to the refrigerator mode
cleared the frost, and the unit operated properly for the remainder of the
mission.
Sample Return Experiment
The Sample Return Experiment (SRE), which is a passive cosmic dust collector,
showed no anomalies on downlink television. Results of this experiment will be
obtained from laboratory analysis and will be reported in separate
documentation.
Three-Dimensional Micro_ravity Accelerometer
The Three-Dimensional Microgravity Accelerometer (3-DMA) front panel g-level
displays failed to activate. A problem with the experiment prevented data from
being downlinked; however, onboard data recording hardware worked properly for
on-orbit acceleration measurements. Results of that data will be obtained
through ground-data analysis. An operational problem during experiment
installation prevented the instrument from recording ascent and descent data.
WAKESHIELDFACILITY
The pre-deployment checkout of the USFand the RMSwent well, and as a result,
the WSFwas grappled at 036:11:13.57 G.m.t. (01:23:03:57 MET)with unberthing at
036:12:23:41G.m.t. (02:00:13:41 MET). After moving into the ram-cleaning
position, the proper configuration becameuncertain due to the status lights
being maskedby the sunlight. Troubleshooting resulted in a loss of
communication capability. The WSFfree-flyer (FF) was berthed overnight at
036:20:58:21G.m.t. (02:08:48:21 MET). Evaluation of the events indicated the
communication problem was related to near-field radio frequency (RF) multipath
interference on the WSFor a payload RF communication problem. On flight day 4,
the WSFFF was again grappled at 037:11:14:10 G.m.t. (02:23:04:10 MET)and
unberthed at 037:11:53:51G.m.t. (02:23:43:51 MET). Additional communication
losses occurred, but communication was recovered with a hard reboot of the
spacecraft computer (SC 2).
During the checkout of the attitude determination and control system (ADACS),
the data indicated the inability of the ADACS to properly determine the WSF
attitude. Troubleshooting was unsuccessful. At this point in the mission, time
prevented accomplishing alternate methods for deployment and retrieval.
Therefore, an agreement was reached to not deploy the WSF. With the WSF on the
RMS in the Molecular Beam Epitaxy (MBE) growth position, five crystals were
grown. The Reflection High Energy Election Diffraction (RHEED) gun filament
that monitors the growth rate and surface characteristics of the epitaxially
grown material during processing failed. This failure did not inhibit crystal
growth. Charge Analysis and Wake Study (CHAWS) data collection followed the
crystal growths, but the study was occasionally perturbed by commanding
prob]ems. The final berthing of the WSF FF occurred at 040:12:18:27 G.m.t.
(06:00:08:27 MET) and the RMS was ungrappled from the WSF at 040:12:45:29 G.m.t.
(06:00:35:29 MET).
Approximately four hours after latching the WSF to its carrier, the Payload
Latch 2 Release Command indicator changed state to show that the release command
was present (Flight Problem STS-60-V-05). The logic power and mechanical power
to the latches were off at the time, and the latch microswitches continued to
indicate a latched condition. The latches were not powered up again, and
multiple inhibits to latch movement were present throughout the remainder of the
mission. This problem is discussed in the Avionics and Software Support section
of this report.
At 042:13:55 G.m.t. (08:01:45 MET), the Payload Latch 2 latch indication A
changed from a latched to a not-latched state. The payload Latch 2 system B
indication had transferred 1.6 seconds earlier than system A during WSF
latching. This resulted in the system A microswitch being minimally actuated.
The failure has been isolated during KSC troubleshooting to payload latch
rigging, which will be rigged correctly prior to the next flight. This problem
has been assigned to the KSC Payloads group for resolution and documentation.
CAPL/ODERACS/BREMSAT/GAS BRIDGE ASSEMBLY
Capillary Pumped Loop
While only nine of the 67 planned tests were completed, much was learned about
the use of a capillary system as a thermal control system for spacecraft.
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Specifi,m]ly, the Capillary PumpedLoop (CAPL)science revealed that the
ground-verified start-up procedures will not work reliably in zero-g. This
information will be incorporated into the design of the Earth Observation System
(EOS). The effect of extended time in cold attitudes (experienced during the
VSFactivities) madestart-up even more difficult. A redesign of the CAPL is
underway with plans for flying the experiment on a future flight of Space
Shuttle.
Orbital Debris Radar Calibration Spheres
The six Orbital Debris Radar Calibration Spheres (ODERACS) were deployed on time
at 040:14:53:24 G.m.t. (06:02:53:24 MET). All tracking stations locked onto the
spheres as predicted.
Bremen Satellite Experiment
After warming the Bremen Satellite Experiment (BREMSAT) up to -12 °C, the
BREMSAT was successfully deployed at 040:19:23:17 G.m.t. (06:07:13:17 MET). The
ground station at the University of Bremen reported that the spacecraft is
healthy with the attitude control system operating nominally. Two experiments'
data recording during the first 48 hours of the mission was lost due to a
spacecraft malfunction. The atomic oxygen experiment (experiment 6) and the
dust detector experiment (experiment 3) are operating nominally and providing
good data. Experiments 4 and 5 have not been operated as of this writing.
Reactivation of experiments 1 and 2 is planned for the future.
Getaway Special Brid_e Assembly
The Getaway Specials (GAS) experiments located on the bridge assembly in the
payload bay were nominally performed by the crew. Data from these experiments
was processed after the flight, and the success of these experiments will be
determined from postflight data review and analysis. The results will be
published in separate documentation.
AURORAL PHOTOGRAPHY EXPERIMENT-B
The Auroral Photography Experiment-B (APE-B) primary purpose on this flight was
to support the USF CBAWS experiment. Two opportunities were available for
additional APE-B operations. Success of these operations will be determined
upon examination of the photography during the postflight time frame.
SHUTTLE AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIMENT
The Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment (SAREX) was successfully used in making
five school contacts. These contacts were with schools in Moscow, Russia;
Boise, Idaho; Mars, Pennsylvania; Chariton, Iowa; and Sidney, Maine. In
addition, the SAREX was to be used to contact Mir (Russian Space Station)
personnel, but all attempts at communicating with the Mir were unsuccessful.
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
All Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) systems performed as expected. The SRB prelaunch
countdown was normal. The right-hand SRB rock hydraulic power unit (HPU) gas
generator (GG) bed temperature measurement (primary A) became erratic shortly
after GG bed heater activation. The right-hand secondary GG bed temperature
sensor was used to control the heater for that system. No SRB LCC or Operations
and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD) violations
occurred.
Both SRBs were successfully separated from the External Tank (ET) 125.1 seconds
after liftoff, and reports from the recovery area indicated that the
deceleration subsystems performed satisfactorily.
A suspension line and the confluence keeper on the right-hand drogue parachute
was severed during drogue parachute deployment. This is a first-time occurrence
of this problem. Investigation has concluded that the llne twisted during
deployment, partially cutting the line on a metal staple used by the
manufacturer during sewing operations. The weakened line then broke under the
load. Further details can be found in the Space Shuttle STS-60 Flight
Evaluation Report, Volume II, MSFC-RPT-2051.
Both SRBs were recovered and towed back to Port Canaveral from where the SRBs
were transferred to KSC for disassembly and refurbishment.
REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTOR
This thirty-fifth RSRM flight set performed nominally, and no LCC violations
occurred. No RSRM anomalies have been identified from the data analysis.
Power-up and operation of all igniter and field-joint heaters was accomplished
routinely. The igniter joint heaters operated for 18 hours 14 minutes, with
power being applied to the heating element 98 percent of the time to maintain
the igniter joints in their normal operating range. The field joint heater
power was applied 59 percent of the time during the LCC time frame to keep the
joint temperatures within their normal operating range.
The aft skirt GN? purge was operated intermittently prior to launch for a total
of 42 hours and _9 minutes. To ensure that all hazardous gases were removed
from the aft skirt compartment, the purge was operated at the high flow-rate
prior to launch. As a result of the purge operation, the calculated flex
bearing mean bulk temperature was 86 °F.
Propulsion performance data shown in the following table show that the flight
performance of both RSRMs was within the contract end item (CEI) specification
limits, and was typical of the performance observed on previous flights. The
RSRM propellant bulk temperature (PMBT) was 61 °F at liftoff, but for the
purposes of evaluation, the PMBT was adjusted to 60 °F standard.
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RSRMPROPULSIONPERFORMANCE
Parameter
Impulse ga_es
1-20, 101 ibf-sec
1-60, I0_ ibf-sec
I-AT, I0_ lbf-sec
Vacuum Isp, lbf-sec/lbm
IBurn rate, in/sec @ 60°F
at 625 psia
iBurn rate, in/sec @ 72°F
at 625 psia
Event times, seconds
Ignition interval
Web time a
Separation cue, 50 psia
Action time a
Separation command
PMBT, OF
Maximum ignition rise rate,
psia/10 ms
Decay time, seconds
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Tailoff imbalance Impulse
differential, KLBF-sec
Left motor, 61 °F
Predicted
65.19
173.95
296.67
268.40
0.3695
0.3698
0.232
110.4
120.2
122.3
125.1
61.00
90.4
Actual
65.28
174.67
297.59
269.30
0.3694
0.3697
N/A
110.1
120.2
122.0
125.1
61.00
N/A
2.5
Predicted
N/A
Predicted
Right motor, 61 °F
Actual
65.35 65.44
174.35 174.80
296.91 296.97
268.40 268.50
0.3698 0.3703
0.3701 0.3706
0.232
110.2
120.0
122.1
124.9
61.00
90.4
2.8
Act ua_
250.5 _
2.8
N/A
110.2
I19.7
122.1
125.1
61.00
N/A
3.3
Notes:
a All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by the
letter a. Those items are referenced to lift-off time (ignition interval).
b
Impulse imbalance = left motor - right motor
All ground environment instrumentation (GEl) and operational flight
instrumentation (OFI) performed within established requirements. Postflight
inspection of the motors indicated nominal performance. No abnormal insulation
erosion was noted. All J-joint (igniter and field) performed as designed.
EXTERNAL TANK
All objectives and requirements associated with the ET propellant loading and
flight operations were met. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation
operated satisfactorily. The ET purge and heater operation were monitored, and
all performed satisfactorily. No ET LCC or OMRSD violations were identified.
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The nose cone purge heater and temperature control system operated successfully.
There were no LCC or OMRSD temperature violations, but unusually wide
oscillations in heater outlet and nose cone compartment temperatures did occur
until the heater reached maximum power.
Typical ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during the countdown.
There was light frost, but no ice on the acreage areas of the ET. Normal
quantities of ice or frost were present on the liquid oxygen (L02) and liquid
hydrogen (LH2) feedlines and on the pressurization line brackets, and some frost
or ice was present along the LH 2 protuberance air load (PAL) ramps. These
observations were all acceptable per NSTS-08303. The Ice/Frost "Red Team"
reported that there were no anomalous thermal protection system (TPS)
conditions.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and
flight. The minimum LO 2 ullage pressure experienced during the ullage pressure
slump was 12.7 paid.
ET separation was confirmed, and the ET entry and breakup occurred 58 nmi.
uprange of the preflight prediction. Post-separation photography of the ET from
the Orbiter revealed no anomalous conditions that were visible to the cameras.
A more detailed discussion of the ET photography is contained in the Development
Test Objective section under the DTO 312 discussion.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES
All Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) parameters were normal throughout the
prelaunch countdown and were typical of prelaunch parameters observed on
previous flights. Engine "ready" was achieved at the proper time; all LCC were
met; and engine start and thrust buildup were normal.
Flight data indicate that the SSME performance during mainstage, throttling,
shutdown, and propellant dump operations was normal. High pressure oxidizer
turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures appeared
to be well within the specification limits throughout engine operation. Space
Shuttle main engine cutoff (MECO) occurred 512 seconds after liftoff.
An anomalous pressure spike was observed 1.72 seconds after SSME 1 start in the
emergency shutdown (EMSD) pressure measurement data (Flight Problem STS-60-E-I).
The spike was deemed unreal data and a possible transducer failure. This
pressure sensor is not flight critical; however, it is used during chill, start,
and main stage to verify the emergency shutdown solenoid function and can cause
a scrub or pad abort. During purge sequence 3 (PSN-3) the EMSD pressure is
verified to be between 600 and 900 psia. A sensor outside these limits inhibits
engine start. From PSN-4 to start enable, the pressure is verified to be less
than 50 psia. Again, a sensor above this limit will inhibit engine start. From
engine start to the end of mainstage, the EMSD pressure must indicate outside
the 600 to 900 psia limits. A sensor indicating between these limits will cause
a pad abort before SRB ignition. An EMSD pressure between 600 and 900 psia
would indicate that the EMSD solenoid has failed open (deenergized).
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SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were
armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS
measurements indicated that the system operated satisfactorily throughout the
countdown and flight.
One gage of holddown stud 6 recorded unusual data during SSME thrust buildup.
The redundant gage of holddown stud 6 did not show any anomalous behavior, which
indicates the stud functioned properly.
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB system power was turned off
prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET separation from
the Orbiter.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the main propulsion system (MPS) was nominal with no
OMRSD or LCC violations. LO 2 and LH? loading were performed as planned with no
stop-flows or reverts. However, the'speed sensors for LH2 recirculation pumps I
and 3 indicated zero throughout the loading process. Measurements of pump
current, pump voltage, and pump AP provided a satisfactory alternate means of
determining pump operation. This type of failure has been seen seven times.
Previous failures have been attributed to cryogenic fatigue. Subsequent
troubleshooting of OV-I03 verified the continuity at ambient temperatures, which
is needed to satisfy dry-spin tests performed in the Vehicle Assembly Building.
As long as the indicators operate at ambient temperatures, no further action
will need to be taken.
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the
Orbiter aft compartment (occurred shortly after start of fast-fill) was
approximately 101 ppm, which compares favorably with previous data for this
vehicle.
The LH 2 loading operations were normal through chilldown, slow-fill, fast-fill,
topping and replenish. Based on an analysis of loading system data, the LH 2
load at the end of replenish was 231,739 Ibm. A comparison of the actual load
with the inventory (predicted) load of 231,853 ib yields a difference of
-0.05 percent, which is within the required MPS loading accuracy of
+ 0.37 percent.
The LO 2 loading operations were normal through chilldown, slow-fill, fast-fill,
topping and replenish. Based on an analysis of loading system data, the LO^
load at the end of replenish was 1,387,917 ibm. A comparison of the actualZload
with the inventory (predicted) load of 1,387,828 Ibm yields a difference of
+0.01 percent, which is within the required MPS loading accuracy of
+ 0.43 percent.
12
Ascent HPS performance was completely normal. Data indicate that the LO 2 and
LH 2 pressurization systems performed as planned, and satisfied all tank ullage
pressure requirements. Performance analysis of the propulsion systems during
start, mainstage and shutdown operations indicated that performance was nominal
and all requirements were satisfied.
The gaseous hydrogen (GHp) flow control valves operated nominally with 71 cycles
on SSME i, 68 cycles on $SME 2, and 37 cycles on SSME 3.
The only problem noted was the rate of MPS pneumatic regulator pressure decay,
which was twice the rate expected based on historical data but within
specification. Troubleshooting revealed that three-way solenoids LV78, 79, and
84 were leaking excessively. The valves were replaced during turnaround
operations.
The MPS helium system performed as expected and met all requirements during
powered flight operation as well as propellant dump and vacuum inerting.
All MPS components performed nominally during entry and landing. Helium
consumption during entry was 59.0 Ibm, which is within the flight history of
OV-I03.
There were two new MPS configurations on STS-60. The MPS liquid oxygen (L09)
bleed check valves were redesigned and flown for the first time on 0V-103. -The
spring between the flappers was replaced with a 30-degree wedge. All three
valves performed nominally and closed as verified by the LO^ inlet pressures.
The valves have been replaced on 0V-102, OV-103, and OV-105_ STS-60 was also
the first flight of actual 750-psi regulator calibrations on 0V-103.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The RCS performed nominally throughout the STS-60 mission with no anomalies or
problems noted. Propellant consumption from the RCS was 4349.3 Ibm. In
addition, 2.80 percent of OHS propellant were used from the left OMS pod and
3.41 percent was used from the right OMS pod through the RCS.
The RCS was used for attitude control while the crew was taking pictures of the
ET for DTO 312. Approximately 154 ibm of propellant was used in excess of the
amount planned.
With the WSF on the RMS during flight day 4, the Orbiter maintained a
tail-to-earth gravlty-gradlent attitude to minimize RCS thruster firings. In
this attitude, RCS thruster FSL experienced a cold environment (coupled with no
vernier thruster firings) that caused the oxidizer valve temperature to fall
below the redundancy management (RM) deselection limit of 130 eF during the crew
sleep period. The thruster was deselected by RM at 038:05:48 G.m.t.
(03:17:38 MET), along with vernier attitude control. The thruster was
reselected after the crew sleep period. Anticipating a similar false
"fail-leak" annunciation during the following sleep period, the forward RCS
manifold 5 thruster heater switch was turned off to allow both F5L and FSR to
annunciate their alarms prior to the sleep period. Following this second crew
sleep period, and a subsequent recovery of the injector temperatures to above
130 °F, the two vernier thrusters were reselected.
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Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
The 0MS performed very satlsfactorily with a total of 397.9 seconds of firing
time during which 15,769.8 ibm of propellants were used. In addition, the OMS
was interconnected to the RCS, during which time the RCS used 2.80 percent of
the left OMS pod propellants and 3.41 percent of the right OMS propellants.
Details of the two maneuvers performed are shown in the following table.
OMS
firing
2
Deorbit
Engine
used
Both
Both
Time, G.m.t./MET
034:12:52:16.3 G.m.t.
00:00:42:16.3 MET
042:18:14:50.3 G.m.t.
08:06:04:50.3 MET
Firing
duration,
sec
163.5
234.4
Z_V
ft/sec
268.3
OMS problems noted during the data review were that the left forward fuel probe
was reading off-scale high, and the left aft fuel probe was indicating high
after the deorbit maneuver. These are known recurring problems. All other
probes indicated the expected amount of propellant quantities remaining
throughout the mission.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performed nominally
throughout the mission, supplying 2090 ibm of oxygen and 263.3 lbm of hydrogen
for fuel cell use and 55 ibm of oxygen for crew breathing. Consumable oxygen
and hydrogen remaining at landing would have provided for a 65-hour mission
extension at the average power level of 15.2 kW.
The quantity sensor for oxygen tank 2 was erratic and read as much as 4-percent
higher than the actual quantity (Flight Problem STS-60-V-04). The erratic
readings were present with or without a demand on the tank, as well as with tank
quantities as low as 30 percent. This condition was also found in data from
previous flights of 0V-103 beginning with STS-48 (flight 13). Alternate methods
were used to accurately ascertain the oxygen tank 2 quantity. No correlation
has been seen between thls erratic behavior and vehicle-lnduced reactions, such
as RCS vernier or primary thruster firings, PRSD manifold valve closures or
check valve leakages, or tank usage. Failures or problems with the quantity
probe or signal conditioner have been investigated, but no cause for this type
of behavior could be isolated.
Oxygen tank 4 was satisfactorily depleted to 5.9 percent, which is below the
defined residual quantity of 6.5 percent. Likewise, hydrogen tank 4 was also
satisfactorily depleted to 2.0 percent, which is below the defined residual
quantity of 2.5 percent.
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Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The fuel cell powerplant performed nominally throughout the mission. The
Orbiter electrical power averaged 15.2 kU and the total Orbiter load averaged
498 amperes. For the 199.2-hour mission, the fuel cells produced 3029 kUh of
electrical energy and 2,353 ib of potable water. The fuel cells consumed
2,090 ib of oxygen and 263.3 ib of hydrogen. Four fuel cell purges were
performed, occurring at approximately 21, 69, 121, and 189 hours MET. The
actual fuel cell voltages at the end of the mission were 0.05 volt above the
level predicted for fuel cell I, and as predicted for fuel cells 2 and 3.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The APU subsystem performance was satisfactory with no problems or anomalies
identified. The following table shows the run-times for each APU as well as the
fuel consumption for each APU.
APU 1 (S/N 405) APU 2 (S/N 406) APU 3 (S/N 404)
Flight Phase Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption,
lb lb lb
Ascent
FCS checkout
Entry a
20:32
06:08
60:37
59
21
129
20:02 61 20:53 51
U5:48 185 60:29 129
Total a'b 87:17 209 105:50 246 81:22 180
Notes:
a APU's I, 2, and 3 ran for 16 minutes, 19 seconds after landing.
b
Totals include ascent, FCS checkout, and entry.
The APU Shutdown Test - DTO 414 was performed after ascent with the APU shutdown
order being 2, l, and 3. No unusual data signatures were noted following the
shutdown sequence.
Fault detection and annunciation (FDA) alarms occurred at 034:12:30 G.m.t.
(00:00:20 MET) when the APU 1 and APU 2 test line temperature decreased below
the 48 °F FDA limit. APU 1 and 2 test line temperatures decreased to 46 °F and
48 °F, respectively. The crew activated the heaters and nominal performance was
observed. Crew procedures have recently been changed to prevent the alarms by
activating the heaters earlier after APU shutdown following ascent. However, on
this mission, the new procedure still did not require activation of the heaters
early enough to prevent the alarms. Consequently, documentation has been
released to change the FDA limits in the Orbiter software.
All three APUs were removed from the vehicle after this flight as the 21-month
wetted time limit for the gas generator valve module (GGVM) will be reached
prior to the next flight of this vehicle.
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HTdraulics/Vater Spray Boiler Subsystem
Performance of the hydraulics/water spray boiler (USB) subsystem was nominal
throughout the mission.
DTO 414 (APU Shutdown Test - Sequence B) was performed to help determine why the
hydraulics system 3 supply pressure hung up for about 40 seconds when APU 3 was
shut down early during ascent on STS-54. The theory was that the hang-up was
caused by back-driving the system 3 rudder speedbrake (RSB) power drive unit
(PDU) motors. The DTO was performed with a APU 2, APU I, and APU 3 shutdown
sequence with at least 5 seconds between the shutdown of each individual APU.
No anomalous pressure hang-ups or PDU motor back-driving were noted in the data.
On flight day 2 at 35:07:00 G.m.t. (00:18:50 MET) the WSB 3 gaseous nitrogen
(GN 2) regulator demonstrated an internal leak of 25 sccm for about 30 minutes,
and the USB 3 regulator outlet pressure increased from 26.4 psia to 27.3 psia
(Flight Problem STS-60-V-06). At that point, the leak stopped. Termination of
the internal leak suggests transient contamination; however, the regulator is an
older configuration regulator, and this leak may be an indication of on-going
problems in the older configuration hardware.
During entry, WSB 2 had three minor periods of over-cooling with the minimum
lube oil temperature observed being approximately 233 *F on the first two
instances and 234 OF on the third instance (normal temperature = 252 °F). This
condition was very minor and did not impact entry operations.
Electrical Power Distribution and Control
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed
satisfactorily throughout the mission. No problems or anomalies were noted from
the data review.
Environmental Control and Life Support STstem
The ECLSS performed nominally during the STS-60 mission with two anomalies
identified.
During Spacehab activation, a nominal procedure consisted of removing a diffuser
cap from the middeck floor air duct fitting and then placing it in the tunnel
adapter floor fitting to prevent air suction from that tunnel adapter section.
Insufficient clearance existed between the tunnel adapter floor fitting and the
tunnel adapter floor;consequently, nominal placement of the diffuser cap was
unsuccessful (Flight Problem STS-60-V-O1). The diffuser cap was taped in place
and performed the intended function satisfactorily. The postflight tests at KSC
revealed that the duct was not configured in accordance with the drawing, and
the duct configuration was corrected.
The active thermal control system (ATCS) performed nominally. At
034:13:37 G.m.t. (00:01:27 MET), approximately 15 minutes after radiator flow
initiation, the flash evaporator system (FES) primary A controller shut down in
the full-up mode. The FES was restarted, only to shut down again when the crew
cycled the primary controller off and then on. At 034:13:47 G.m.t.
(00:01:37 MET), the crew successfully restarted the FES and it functioned
normally for the remainder of the mission. The first shutdown was caused by a
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knownphenomenonin the OV-103 FES, which has a unique midpoint-sensor block
design. The unique design introduces a thermal lag into the control system that
results in outlet-temperature oscillations which may cause the FES to shut down.
The second shutdown has been attributed to a combination of a low heat load on
the FES and the thermal lag of the midpoint temperature sensor block. This
phenomenon is not a problem.
The radiator coldsoak provided cooling during entry through touchdown plus
II minutes when ammonia system A was activated. Ammonia system A controlled the
Freon evaporator outlet temperature to 37 °F using the unique OV-102/OV-103
procedures to prevent under-temperature operation of the boiler. System A
operated for 28 minutes before it was depleted, after which System B was
activated. System B operated at 37 °F for lO minutes before the ground cooling
was activated.
The supply water and waste management systems performed adequately. Supply
water was managed through the use of the overboard dump system and the FES.
Five supply water dumps were performed at an average dump rate of
1.47 percent/minute (2.43 lb/minute). One supply water dump was also made to a
CWC because of the payload constraints on dumping water. This dump was
performed at an average dump rate of 2.54 percent/minute (4.20 lb/min). The CWC
was later dumped overboard via the waste water dump line at an average rate of
0.80 percent/min (1.32 lb/min). The supply water dump line temperature was
maintained between the satisfactory levels of 64 °F and 106 °F throughout the
mission with the operation of the line heater.
Waste water was gathered at approximately the predicted rate. Four waste water
dumps were performed at an average rate of 1.9 percent/minute (3.13 lb/min).
The waste water dump line temperature was maintained between the satisfactory
levels of 56 °F and 86 °F throughout the mission with the operation of the line
heater.
Following the supply water dump at 036:09:44 G.m.t. (01:21:34 MET), I0 discrete
instances of supply-water dump-valve leakage were noted (Flight Problem
STS-60-V-02). The leakage occurred over a 16-hour 33-minute period which
included the time during which the WSF was being maneuvered by the RMS.
Following the post-sleep activities on flight day 4, the crew purged the supply
dump line, and subsequent supply water dumps were performed with the USF berthed
and were followed by a supply water dump line purge. This "burping" phenomenon
has occurred on STS-53, STS-48, STS-44, STS-56, and STS-51 prior to this
mission, and is suspected to have occurred on previous flights of OV-I03 and
OV-104. However, the leakage occurrences on STS-60 were more numerous and
encompassed a longer time period than those experienced on previous flights.
Corrective actions from the previous flights have included removing and
replacing the supply water dump line and valve (STS-48), and rewrapping the dump
line heater (STS-53). It is theorized that the intermittent leakage (burping)
from the supply water dump valve may have been caused by ice formation at the
valve outlet bellows. The scenario for this condition is that after termination
of the dump, some water remains trapped in the outlet bellows convolutions; the
water then freezes causing the outlet bellows to expand; this makes the bellows
shaft move which unseats the poppet, thus allowing water to leak (burp); the
leakage water is warmer, therefore causing the ice to melt and the poppet to
reseat. The process could repeat depending on the conditions of each dump.
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The waste collection system (WCS) performed normally during the mission. One
transient shutdown of the WCS fan separator occurred; however, it is suspected
to be due to inadvertent switch operation because the WCS performed
satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission.
The ARS performed nominally; however, the water coolant loop bypass valve on
system 2 responded slowly. This is an acceptable condition for OV-103.
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system (ARPCS) performance was
nominal. During the period of the mission when WSF operations were ongoing, the
cabin pressure reached 15.2 psia, the alarm limit for overpressurization, at
039:23:05 G.m.t. (05:10:55 MET). During the flight day 6 sleep period, the
alarm limit was raised to 15.4 psia to preclude nuisance alarms, and the oxygen
supply to the oxygen bleed orifice was inhibited to prevent additional gas flow
into the cabin. After inhibiting the oxygen bleed orifice, the cabin pressure
remained stable at 15.04 psia overnight. The cabin pressure alarm was caused by
a combination of factors which included the following:
a. The closed WCS vacuum vent valve (to prevent WSF contamination while on
the RMS) resulted in reduced overboard venting by 6.0 ib/day;
b. Small amount of Orbiter, tunnel adapter, and Spacehab structural
leakage;
c. Partial pressure of oxygen was slowly increasing and that was indicative
of the oxygen bleed orifice flowing at a slightly higher rate than the 6-man
metabolic consumption rate;
d. Normal venting of GN 2 into the cabin as the water tanks filled (minimal
effect);
e. Cabin humidity increase and warmer air temperatures in the avionics bays
because of warmer water loop temperatures caused by high evaporator outlet
temperatures; and
f. GN freezer in middeck venting 0.912 ib/day of nitrogen into the crew
compartment.
Based on these factors, it has been concluded that no out-of-specification
leakage existed in the Orbiter ARPCS. After resuming normal cabin operations,
the cabin pressure returned to its normal control band (14.7 Z0.2 psia).
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression SubsTstem
The smoke detection and fire suppression system monitoring parameters indicated
nominal performance and no smoke generation during the mission. Use of the fire
suppression subsystem was not required.
Airlock Support STstem
All airlock support system parameters indicated normal performance throughout
the flight. No extravehicular activity was performed, consequently, the airlock
support components were not used.
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Avionics and Software Support System
The integrated guidance, navigation and control subsystem performed nominally as
also did the flight control system and star trackers.
The inertial measurement units (IMUs), which were all KT-7Os, performed
nominally. New compensation values were uplinked to the IMUs three times during
the mission. These KT-70 units will be replaced with high accuracy inertial
navigation system (HAINS) units prior to the next flight of this vehicle.
One item of interest was noted at 040:14:35 G.m.t. (06:02:25 MET), when an IMU 2
BITE (Built In Test Equipment) occurred at IMU 2 deselect. The BITE occurrence
is believed to have been caused by an I/O (input/output) reset. This condition
has occurred in the past and is not an IMU problem.
At 034:12:18 G.m.t. (00:00:08 MET), display electronics unit (DEU) 3 experienced
a symbol generator character parity error, as indicated in the backup flight
system (BFS) software error buffer. Further BFS keystrokes were normal (no
parity error). The crew did not report any cathode ray tube (CRT) display
anomalies or tripping of the DEU BITE flag. CRT 3 was powered off in accordance
with nominal on-orbit procedures, and this configuration was maintained until
flight day 8 when DEU 3 and CRT 3 were powered up for 1 hour 42 minutes to
support FCS checkout. Both units performed satisfactorily during the checkout.
This condition is characterized as a single event upset and is not a concern.
Several hours after WSF operations on the RMS were completed and the WSF was
latched into its carrier, a latch 2 release indicator [multiplexer/demultiplexer
(MDM) operational forward (OF) 2 discrete input high (DIH) card 4 channel 0
bit 16] changed state at 40:16:07 G.m.t. (06:03:57 MET) to indicate the release
command was present (Flight Problem STS-60-V-05). The logic power and
mechanical power to the latches were off at the time, and the latch
microswitches continued to indicate a latched condition which was verified by
the crew. This was not a problem that could impact operations as the latch was
powered off. Postflight troubleshooting at KSC was performed after the Orbiter
was powered down. When the vehicle was powered back up, the anomaly was no
longer present. The switch was cycled several times and did not exhibit any
anomalous characteristics. MDM troubleshooting is in progress as this report is
being written; however, the hardware involved including the MDM will remain on
the vehicle unless further anomalous behavior is demonstrated.
Communications and Tracking Subsystems
The communications and tracking subsystems performed nominally except for the
two anomalies and two occurrences discussed in the following paragraphs.
When the crew transitioned to the on-orbit communications configuration (very
lightweight headsets), the Pilot's HIU failed (Flight Problem STS-60-V-03). The
crew switched to a backup HIU. The failed headset was marked for postflight
testing which will be performed at JSC upon return of the headset.
The closed circuit television (CCTV) camera B was noted to have burned-in spots
and a curved line in the upper part of the image. This condition was visible in
the lens when the iris was fully closed at 40:20:43 G.m.t. (06:08:33 MET).
Standard postflight camera processing tests and checkout will be performed.
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Instances of intercommunications (ICOM), air-to-ground (A/G) 2, and Spacehab
caution and warning tone "bleedover" onto the A/G I channel were noted. The
bleedover was at a very low volume level and did not impact the use of A/G I.
After Spacehab power down, the "bleedover" condition was not observed.
Procedures are being developed to test for "bleedover" during integrated vehicle
testing on Spacehab and Spacelab flights.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
The structures and mechanical subsystems performed nominally.
braking data are presented in the following table.
The landing and
LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS
Parameter
Main gear touchdown
Nose gear touchdown
From
threshold,
ft
2463
7455
Speed,
keas
204.1
134.6
Sink rate, ft/sec
"2.0
n/a
Pitch rate,
deg/sec
n/a
3.52
Braking initiation speed
Brake-on time
Rollout distance
Rollout time
Runway
Orbiter weight at landing
111.6 knots (keas)
26.6 seconds (sustained)
7,771 feet
49.8 seconds
15 (concrete) at KSC SLF
216,594.5 ib (landing estimate)
Brake sensor location
Left-hand inboard 1
Left-hand inboard 3
Left-hand outboard 2
Left-hand outboard 4
Right-hand inboard 1
Right-hand inboard 3
Right-hand outboard 2
Right-hand outboard 4
Peak
pressure#
psia
Brake assembly
1097
1057
1018
1084
1176
1282
i150
1097
Left-hand outboard
Left-hand inboard
Right-hand inboard
Right-hand outboard
Energy,
million ft-lb
13.19
16.68
18.90
15.25
Drag chute performance was satisfactory. The STS-60 drag chute deployment
successfully demonstrated the effect of the recent refinements to increase the
vehicles' directional stability. As with STS-47, the chute system was initiated
at the beginning of nose wheel derotation with the main parachute fully inflated
prior to nose gear touchdown. For STS-60, no lateral directional corrections
were required and the vehicle did not deviate because of chute forces. (During
STS-47, the chute caused the Orbiter to stray approximately 27 feet from the
runway centerline.) The effect of the chute was very evident as an effective
tool in bringing the vehicle to a stop.
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At 041:15:55 G.m.t. (07:03:45 MET), the Commander reported that the crew felt a
shudder in conjunction with hearing a loud noise, similar to the sound of a
primary RCS thruster firing. However, the phenomenon was not associated with a
primary RCS thruster firing. A review of data for all subsystems indicated no
anomalies, and there were no measured accelerations associated with the
phenomenon. The most likely cause of the phenomenon was load relief of the
Spacehab retention hardware with the noise and shudder being transmitted to the
crew cabin through the tunnel adapter structure. The Commander of STS-57 (first
Spacehab mission) reported a similar phenomenon, and the Spacelab
modules/tunnels have a known similar phenomenon of load relief on-orbit. There
was no concern for entry.
At 042:13:55 G.m.t. (08:01:45 MET), the payload latch 2 latch indication A
changed from a latch to a not-latched state. The payload latch 2 system B
indication had transferred 1.6 seconds earlier than system A during WSF
latching. This results in the system A microswitch being minimally actuated.
The failure has been isolated during KSC troubleshooting to payload latch
rigging. This anomaly has been transferred to the KSC Payloads Group for
resolution and documentation.
Integrated Aerodynamics, Heating and Thermal Interfaces
The ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal with no problems, anomalies, or
unexpected conditions identified in the data. The aerodynamic and plume
heating were nominal during ascent and the aerodynamic heating to the SSME
nozzles during descent was nominal. The prelaunch analysis of the thermal
interfaces showed no temperatures in excess of limits. In addition, the gaseous
helium and gaseous nitrogen ET/Orbiter electrical disconnect pressures were
within limits, and the aft compartment helium concentration was within the
experience base.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The performance of the thermal control subsystem (TCS) was nominal during all
phases of the mission, and all Orbiter subsystem temperatures were maintained
within acceptable limits.
One item of interest was that the APU 3 fuel pump drain line temperature 1
cycled near to the lower FDA limit of 48 °F while on-orbit. The lower FDA limit
was changed to 43 °F to ensure that temperatures remained within limits.
Additional details on this problem are found in the Auxiliary Power Unit
Subsystem section of this report.
Aerothermodynamics
The acreage heating was nominal during entry, and no unusual local heating was
noted. The heating to a one-foot radius sphere showed that the trajectory was
slightly higher in peak heating rate and load than previously experienced on
0V-103, but within the experience base for all Orbiters. The thermocouples
reflected this with a slight increase in temperature. Boundary layer transition
on the lover surface was late, at Mach 7.3, but within both 0V-103 and all
Orbiters' experience. The surface temperatures of the left and right OMS pods
were within the experience data base, not shoving any significant heating
asymmetry due to the 0.5-degree sideslip.
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An initial report, which showed an off-nominal aileron excursion around a
relative velocity of I0,000 ft/sec, was incorrect in that the large negative
Y c.g. of this flight required up-aileron to trim. Therefore, as the elevon
schedule moved the elevon more negative around I0,000 ft/sec, the more up-
elevator was less aerodynamically effective resulting in a further up
deflection, thus resulting in the aileron excursion during entry.
Thermal Protection Subsystem
The thermal protection subsystem (TPS) performed satisfactorily. Structural
temperature response data show that the entry heating was above average, and the
TPS performed as designed in preventing heating damage effectively during ascent
and entry. The overall boundary layer transition from laminar flow to turbulent
flow occurred 1235 seconds after entry interface on the forward centerline and
the aft centerline of the vehicle. Transition was symmetric from right to left
on the vehicle.
During flight day 6 activities, the crew observed a damaged TPS blanket on
the upper forward RCS module just aft of the FlU thruster. An RMS video camera
inspection showed that the outer cover material of an advanced flexible reusable
surface insulation (AFRSI) blanket had torn and was protruding. The blanket was
identified as a part of part number V070-391134-050 blanket, which is 6 in. by
5 in. long, and is bonded to an aluminum carrier panel. The torn section was
approximately 4 in. by 1.5 in. in size, and was later determined to be a
degraded patch repair. The blanket batting material was intact. This type of
damage is typical for AFRSI blankets in this location. A review of this
particular blanket's history revealed several minor repairs had been performed
on the blanket as well as having been patched. The blanket covered a carrier
plate and no critical subsystems were located immediately below this area. A
worst-case thermal analysis that assumed a complete loss of the blanket, but
with the room-temperature vulcanizing (RTV) adhesive intact, predicted that the
maximum carrier plate temperature would be 385 eF (positive margin-of-safety)
during entry with the only anticipated damage being to the blanket itself. It
is not uncommon for this particular blanket to see wear damage.
Orbiter debris damage was less than average with only 106 hits, of which 15 had
a major dimension of one inch or greater. However, this number does not include
the numerous hits on the base heat shield that were caused by the flame
arrestment sparkler system. Of the 106 total hits, 48 were on the lower
surface, 28 were on the upper surface, 2 were on the right side, 4 were on the
left side, 7 were on the right OMS pod, and 17 were on the left OMS pod. The
distribution of hits on the vehicle, especially the lower surface, does not
suggest a single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice and
TPS debris from random sources. Furthermore, the postflight inspection showed
that none of the tile damage resulted from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris,
and none of the damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or
brakes.
The main landing gear door (MLGD) thermal barriers were in good condition
overall, although minor damage was noted on some of the thermal barriers from
both the left and right main gear areas. The ET door thermal barriers were in
excellent condition overall. Damage to the ET door tiles was minor, and the
elevon cove and elevon gap tiles and thermal barriers were all in good
condition.
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The engine dome-mounted heat shield blankets were in good condition with minor
fraying to the SSME 3 lower closeout pillow. No damage occurred to tiles as a
result of drag chute deployment.
Orbiter windows 3 and 4 exhibited moderate hazing with some streaks. Only a
very light haze was present on the other windows. Surface wipes were taken from
all the windows for chemical analysis sampling.
The Shuttle thermal imager (STI) was used to measure the surface temperature of
several areas of the vehicle. The Orbiter nosecap reinforced carbon carbon
(RCC) temperature was 170 °F 24 minutes after landing. The leading edge
temperature of RCC panel 9 was 104 °F 27 minutes after landing, and panel 17 was
99 °F at that same time.
The potential identification of debris damage sources for STS-60 will be based
on the laboratory analysis of Orbiter postlanding microchemical samples,
inspection of the recovered SRB components, and film analysis (including
on-orbit photography of the ET). The results of these analyses will be
documented in the STS-60 Ice/Debris/TPS Assessment and Integrated Photographic
Analysis Report (NASA Technical Memorandum 109193).
REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM
The RMS performed satisfactorily in support of Uake Shield Facility activities,
and no RMS anomalies were identified.
The RMS checkout was performed at 35:11:30 G.m.t. (00:23:30 MET), and all
signatures were nominal. At the end of the checkout, the RMS remained in use to
conduct a premission planned CCTV survey of the payload bay. The survey was
shortened, however, to protect the timeline for the planned Spacehab operations.
The RMS was cradled and latched at 35:13:28 G.m.t. (01:01:18 MET).
The RMS activities began with the grapple of the berthed VSF at
36:11:13:57 G.m.t. (01:23:03:57 MET). By 36:12:37 G.m.t. (02:00:27 MET), the
USF was maneuvered to a position placing the experiment carrier on the _SF into
the velocity vector of the Orbiter for cleaning by atomic oxygen impact. USF
communications difficulties were encountered prior to its planned deployment as
a free-flyer. The deployment procedures were replaced with a series of payload
troubleshooting measures. USF performance did not warrant a deployment on
flight day 3, and the USF was reberthed in the Orbiter at 36:20:58:21G.m.t.
(02:08:48:21 MET) after which the RMS was cradled and latched.
The USF deployment was attempted again on flight day 4. After the RMS was
powered and uncradled, grapple with WSF was completed at 37:11:14:10 G.m.t.
(02:23:04:10 MET). The WSF was maneuvered to the cleaning position using the
normal deployment procedures. At 37:14:45 G.m.t. (03:02:35 MET), the WSF was
driven by RMS auto-sequence to a preplanned checkout position prior to
deployment. Again, however, communications and WSF attitude control system
problems prevented deployment. After a second series of troubleshooting
maneuvers, the decision was made to place the RMS/USF in a contingency overnight
parking configuration. During the crew sleep period that followed, crystal
growth was initiated on the USF.
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On flight day 5, the WSFwas berthed in the Orbiter payload bay at
38:17:21:32 G.m.t. (04:05:11:32 MET) to protect its experiment packages from
contamination during a required Orbiter supply and waste water dump. The USF
was again unberthed at 38:20:51:29 G.m.t. (04:08:41:29 MET)and for the second
time parked in the contingency crystal growth position for overnight.
A supply water dump was also required on flight day 6, during which time the WSF
was berthed at 39:11:59:05 G.m.t. (04:23:49:05 MET) and unberthed at
39:14:34:49 G.m.t. (05:02:24:49 MET). Following unberthing, the WSF was placed
in a preplanned configuration for a CHAWS activity. At 39:20:30 G.m.t.
(05:08:20 MET), troubleshooting of the WSF attitude control system involved
firing its main thruster while on the end of the RMS. The low-impulse firing
caused no noticeable RMS movement. At 39:21:19 G.m.t. (05:09:09 MET), the
RMS/WSF was once more placed in the overnight park crystal growth position.
The final berthing of the WSF occurred on flight day 6 with the WSF latched in
the payload bay at 40:12:18:27 G.m.t. (06:00:08:27 MET). After ungrappling from
the WSF at 40:12:45:29 G.m.t. (06:00:35:29 MET), the RMS was used to perform
Tile Survey H of the Orbiter's forward fuselage prior to cradling and latching
the RMS which occurred at 40:14:08 G.m.t. (06:01:58 MET). The manipulator
positioning mechanisms (MPMs) were then rolled in and STS-60 RMS operations were
complete.
FLIGHT CREW EOUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EOUIPMENT
The crew reported that the ac power cable was not connected to the back of the
thermal impulse printer system (TIPS) (Flight Problem STS-60-F-O1). The crew
had to remove the printer from its locker to make the connection.
During flight day 2 activities, the crew asked for the stowage location of the
tunnel adapter stowage net that had been used during training. A check of the
stowage documentation revealed that this net was not onboard as expected by the
crew (Flight Problem STS-60-F-02).
At 039:22:15 G.m.t. (05:10:05 MET), the crew reported that Hasselblad camera
(s/n 1002) had shutter pieces floating around in the 250-mm lens which was
jammed on the camera (Flight Problem STS-60-F-03). Two additional Hasselblad
cameras were onboard and were used by the crew in place of the failed camera.
CARGO INTEGRATION
Cargo integration hardware performed nominally; however, one anomaly was
identified in this area. During Spacehab activation, a diffuser cap could not
be installed on the tunnel adapter floor fitting and had to be taped in place
(Flight Problem STS-60-V-OI). A more detailed discussion of this problem is
contained in the Environmental Control and Life Support System section of this
report.
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DFVELOPME_T TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
A total of 14 DTOs and I0 detailed supplementary objectives (DSOs) were assigned
to the STS-60 mission. Data were not collected for two DTOs and one DSO.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
DT0 301D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - Data were recorded during
ascent for this DTO. The data have been given to the sponsor for analysis, and
the results of the analysis will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 305D - Ascent Compartment Venting Evaluation - Data were recorded during
ascent for this DTO. The data have been given to the sponsor for analysis and
evaluation, and the results of that effort will be reported in separate
documentation.
DTO 306D - Descent Compartment Venting Evaluation - Data were recorded during
descent for this DTO. The data have been given to the sponsor for analysis, and
the results of the analysis effort will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - Data were recorded during entry for
this DTO. The data have been given to the sponsor for analysis, and the results
of the analysis effort will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance (Method 3) - Thirty-seven excellent quality
photographs of the ET (after separation) were acquired using a Nikon camera with
a 300-mm lens and a 2X extender (Method 3). The photographs were taken by crew
member Sergei Krikalev (Soviet Cosmonaut). All sides of the ET were
photographed, although the +Y (right) side of the ET did not come into view
until near the end of the film sequence when the ET was much further away. The
first picture was taken at 034:12:23:54 G.m.t. (00:00:13:54 MET) and the last
picture was taken approximately ll minutes later.
The photographic evaluation showed the ET to be in excellent condition. The
usual SRB booster separation motor (BSM) burn scars and charring of the TPS on
the aft dome and the LH_ tank (aft) are visible. A small light-colored mark is
visible on the -Y (left_ side of the LO? tank TPS just above the intertank area.
A second mark is visible nearby on the LO T tank-to-intertank closeout flange. A
third mark is visible on the intertank TPS below and to the left of the left SRB
forward attach point.
Fifteen minutes of excellent quality video of the ET (after separation) was also
taken by crew member Jan Davis. A camcorder with a 2X extender and a 15 to 1
zoom lens was used to image the ET. All sides of the ET were imaged. The video
analysis showed the ET to be in the expected good condition. No significant ET
surface features were observed that were not seen in the 35 mm film.
DTO 319D - Shuttle/Payload Low Frequency Environment - Data were recorded for
this DTO, and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The
results of the evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 414 - APU Shutdown Test, Sequence B - This DTO was performed at APU shutdown
after ascent with the shutdown sequence being APU 2, APU l, and APU 3,
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respectively. No PDUback-driving was noted, and all pressure slope changes
corresponded to switching-valve changes of state as expected. Final results of
this DTOwill be published in separate documentation.
DTO 623 - Cabin Air Monitoring - Data were collected for this DTO. These data
have been given to the sponsor for analysis. The results of that analysis will
be documented in other publications.
DTO 656 - Payload General Support Computer (PGSC) Single Event Upset Monitoring
- Data were collected for this DTO. These data are being analyzed by the
sponsor, and the results will be published in separate documentation.
DTO 664 - Cabin Temperature Survey - Temperature data were collected during the
mission, and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The
results of that evaluation will be published in separate documentation.
DTO 670 - Evaluation of Passive Cycle Isolation System - The DTO was not
performed as the hardware required for the investigation was removed prior to
launch.
DTO 700-2 - Laser Range and Range Rate Device - This DTO was not performed
since the WSF deployment and rendezvous were canceled because of operational
problems. As a result, the laser was only used to obtain range and range rate
data on the BREHSAT following its deployment. The major activity for this DTO
was to be in conjunction with the rendezvous with the WSF.
DTO 700-7 - Orbiter Data for Real-Time Navigation Evaluation - The primary
objective of the DTO was not accomplished because of the cancellation of the _SF
rendezvous and plume tests experiment. However, the hardware for this DTO did
enable an onboard PGSC pulse code modulation master unit (PCMMU) interface
during the WSF CHAWS activities, providing the crew with downlink data, thereby
enhancing the operations and air-to-ground communications.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO was to be performed if
environmental (crosswind) conditions at landing met the minimum criteria for the
DTO. Crosswinds were below the minimum requirements of the DTO, therefore it
was not performed.
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 200 - Joint U.S./Russian Investigation: Radiobiological Effects - The Tissue
Equivalent Proportional Counter (TEPC) and the U. S. and Russian dosimeters were
set up to collect data according to premission planning. These data have been
given to the sponsors for evaluation, and the results of that evaluation will be
published in separate documentation.
DSO 201 - Joint U.S./Russian Sensory-Motor Investigations - Most of the science
objectives for the voluntary head movements (VHM) and Optokinetic Nystagmus
(ON) were met. The activities required more time than expected; therefore, some
deletions of tests were necessary to fit within the tight timeline.
Approximately 30 to 50 percent of the science was estimated to have been lost
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over what was planned premission. Autonomic and Gastric Function activities
were completed as planned. Postflight, the data were given to the sponsors for
analysis to determine scientific return. The results of the analysis will be
published in separate documentation.
DSO202 - Joint U.S./Russian Investigations: Metabolic - All activities in
support of this DSOwere completed, and the scientific return from this DSOis
expected to be very significant. The data have been given to the sponsors for
analysis, and the results of that analysis will be published in separate
documentation.
DSO204 - Joint U.S./Russian Investigations: Visual Observations from Space -
All activities in support of this DSO_serecompleted according to premission
plans. The data obtained during the DSOobservations have been given to the
sponsor for analysis, and the results of that analysis will be published in
separate documentation.
DSO325 - Dried Blood Method for In-Flight Storage (Protocol l) - This DSOwas
not performed becauseof timeline constraints.
DSO 326 - Window Impact Observations - Observations in support of this DSO were
made and theresults of those observations have been given to the sponsor for
analysis. The results of the analysis will be published in separate
documentation.
DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crewmembers - Data for this DSO were
collected during preflight and postflight activities. These data have been
given to the sponsor for analysis. The results of that analysis will be
published in separate documentation.
DSO 901 - Documentary Television - Many Public Affairs Office (PAO) events
occurred on this flight and have been documented on video tape. These special
events included:
a. First live hookup between the Orbiter and Mir via 'Good Morning America';
b. A conference with President Bill Clinton;
c. A conference with the Director General of the Russian Space Agency, Mr.
Yuri Koptev;
d. A conference with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin;
e. An interview with Ron Sega and Sergei Krikalev on CNN; and
f. An interview with Charles Bolden and Franklin Chang-Diaz on BET.
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - Motion picture photography
obtained for this DSO have been turned over to the sponsor for analysis. The
results of that analysis will be reported in separate documentation.
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - Still photographs were obtained
in support of this DSO. These data have been given to the sponsor for analysis.
The results of that analysis will be reported in separate documentation.
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PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSES
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO ANALYSIS
On launch day, 24 videos of the launch were screened, and no anomalies were
noted. Following the launch day, 54 of the planned 55 films of the launch were
reviewed, and no potential anomalies were noted. The film from camera E-222 was
not delivered.
Multiple pieces of debris were photographed falling aft of the Shuttle vehicle at
liftoff, throughout the roll maneuver, and beyond on the launch tracking views.
Most of the debris sightings were apparently either paper that is used to cover
the RCS thrusters during prelaunch operations or ice from the ET/Orbiter
umbilicals. During ascent, multiple pieces of debris exited the SRB exhaust
plume between 65 and 80 seconds after liftoff. None of the debris was observed
to strike the vehicle.
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO ANALYSIS
On-orbit video of the ODERACS experiment deployment was screened to determine the
velocity of the metal spheres as the spheres departed the GAS canister. The
calculated velocity of these spheres ranged from 1.53 to 3.34 meters second. An
analysis was also performed to determine the separation angles between spheres
following deployment.
The results of the on-orbit photography of the ET in support of DTO 312 are
presented in the Development Test Objective section of this report.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO ANALYSIS
Eleven videos of the approach and landing phase plus NASA Select, (which uses
multiple views in real-time) were screened, and no anomalies were noted. In
addition, 16 landing films were also reviewed, and again, no anomalies were
noted.
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TABLE I.- STS-60 SEOUENCE OF EVENTS
Event
APU Activation
SRB HPU Activation a
Main Propulsion System
Start a
SRB Ignition Command
(lift-off)
Throttle Up to
104 Percent Thrust a
Throttle Down to
70 Percent Thrust a
Description
APU-I GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
LH HPU system A start command
LH HPU system B start command
RH HPU system A start command
RH HPU system B start command
Engine 3 start command accepted
Engine 2 start command accepted
Engine 1 start command accepted
SRB ignition command to SRB
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
Maximum Dynamic
Pressure (q)
Throttle Up to
104 Percent Thrust a
Both SRM's Chamber
Pressure at 50 psi a
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
End SRM Action a
SRB Separation Command
SRB Physical
Separation a
3g Acceleration
Derived ascent dynamic 034:
pressure
Engine 3 command accepted 034:
Engine 2 command accepted 034:
Engine 1 command accepted 034:
LH SRM chamber pressure 034:
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure 034:
mid-range select
LB SRM chamber pressure 034:
mid-range select
I_ SRM chamber pressure 034:
mid-range select
SRB separation command flag 034:
LH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 034:
RH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 034:
Total load factor 034:
Throttle Down for
3g Acceleration a
Throttle Down to
67 Percent Thrust a
MECO
Engine Shutdown a
MECO
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine I command accepted
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Command flag
Engine 3 command accept
Engine 2 command accept
Engine 1 command accept
Confirm fla[
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
034:
Actual time,
G.m.t.
12:05:10.87
12:05:12.27
12:05:13.71
12:09:32.120
12:09:32.280
12:09:32.440
12:09:32.600
12:09:53.446
12:09:53.567
12:09:53.695
12:10:00.000
12:10:04.246
12:10:O4.247
12:10:04.256
12:10:25.686
12:10:25.688
12:10:25.696
12:10:52
12:10:57.207
12:10:57.208
12:10:57.217
12:11:59.520
12:12:00.O40
12:12:02.190
12:12:02.320
12:12:05
12:12:05.080
12:12:05.080
12:17:27.8
12:17:27.932
12:17:27.936
12:17:27.944
12:18:25.852
12:18:25.857
12:18:25.865
12:18:32
12:18:32.052
12:18:32.057
12:18:32.065
12:18:33
aMSFC supplied data
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TABLE I.- STS-60 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Continued)
Even t
ET Separation
OMS-1 Ignition
OMS-1 Cutoff
APU Deactivation
OMS-2 Ignition
OMS-2 Cutoff
iPayload Bay Doors Open
IWake Shield Facility
Grapple
Unberth
Berth
Ungrapple
Grapple
Unberth
Berth
Ungrapple
Grapple
Unberth
Berth
Unberth
Berth
Ungrapple
ODERACS deployment
BREMSAT deployment
Flight Control
System Checkout
APU Start
APU Stop
Payload Bay Doors Close
Description
ET separation command flag
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-I GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bl-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
PLBD
PLBD
Actual time,
G.m.t.
034:12:18:52
Not performed -
direct insertion
trajectory flown
034:12:
034:12:
034:12:
034:12:
034:12:
034:12:
034:12:
right open 1 034:13:
left open 1 034:13:
Payload captured
Payload latch 2A released
Payload latch 2A latched
Payload captured
Payload captured
Payload latch 2A released
Payload latch 2A latched
Payload captured
Payload captured
Payload latch 2A released
Payload latch 2A latched
Payload latch 2A released
Payload latch 2A latched
Payload captured
Voice call
Video call
25:12.88
25:42.35
26:06.60
52:16.3
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-I GG chamber pressure
PLBD left close 1
PLBD right close 1
52:16.6
55:00.4
55:00.4
40:02
41:20
036:11:13:57
036:12:23:41
036:20:58:21
036:21:03:19
037:11:14:10
037:11:53:51
038:17:21:32
038:17:24:31
038:17:24:54
038:20:51:29
039:11:59:05
039:14:34:49
040:12:18:27
040:12:45:29
040:14:53:24
040:19:23:17
041:12:29:20.77
041:12:35:28.77
042:14:06:56
042:14:09:17
3O
TABLEI.- STS-60 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Concluded)
Event
APU Activation For
Entry
Deorbit Maneuver
Ignition
Deorbit Maneuver Cutoff
Entry Interface (400K)
Blackout Ends
Terminal Area Energy
Management
Main Landing Gear
Contact
Description
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-I GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Current orbital altitude
above reference ellipsoid
Data locked at high sample
rate
Major mode change (305)
LB MLG tire pressure
RH MLG tire pressure
Actual time,
G.m.t.
Main Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
Drag Chute Deploy
!Nose Landing Gear
Contact
Nose Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
Drag Chute Jettison
Wheels Stop
APU Deactivation
LB MLG weight on wheels
RH MLG weight on wheels
Drag chute deploy I CP Volts
NLG tire pressure
NLG WT on Wheels -I
Drag chute jettison 1CP Volts
Velocity with respect to
runway
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber ressure
042:18:09:49.95
042:18:34:58.99
042:18:35:09.75
O42:18:14:50.3
042:18:14:50.3
042:18:18:45.0
042:18:18:45.0
042:18:47:51
No blackout
042:19:12:45
042:19:19:
042:19:19:
22
22
22
22
32.5
41
042:19:19:
042:19:19:
042:19:19:
O42:19:19:
042:19:19:41
042:19:19:54.9
042:19:20:13
042:19:35:36.37
042:19:35:37.70
042:19:35:38.80
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DOCUMENT SOURCES
In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data
for this mission report, the following list is provided.
lo
2.
3.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I0.
ii.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Flight Requirements Document
Public Affairs Press Kit
Customer Support Room Daily Reports
HER Daily Reports
MER Mission Summary Report
MER Quick Look Report
MER Problem Tracking List
MER Event Times
Subsystem Manager Reports/Inputs
MOD Systems Anomaly List
MSFC Flash Report
MSFC Event Times
MSFC Interim Report
Crew Debriefing comments
Shuttle Operational Data Book
A-I

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions
as these items are used in this document.
3-DMA
ADACS
A/G
APE-B
APU
ARPCS
ARS
ASC-3
ATCS
BFS
BITE
BPL
BPM
Three-Dimensional Microgravity Accelerometer
attitude determination and control system
air-to-ground
Auroral Photography Experiment-B
auxiliary power unit
atmospheric revitalization pressure control system
atmospheric revitalization system
Astroculture-3
active thermal control system
backup flight system
built-in test equipment
Bioserve Pilot Laboratory
bioprocessing module
BREMSAT Bremen Satellite Experiment
BSM booster separation motor
CAPL Capillary Pumped Loop
CCTV closed circuit television
CEI Contract end item
c.g. center of gravity
CGBA Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus
CHAWS Charge Analysis and Wake Study
CPCG Commercial Protein Crystal Growth
CRT cathode ray tube
CWC contingency water container
DEU display electronics unit
DIH discrete input high
DSO Detailed Supplementary Objective
DTO Development Test Objective
AP differential pressure
6V differential velocity
ECLIPSE-
HAB
ECLSS
EMSD
EOS
EPDC
e.s.t.
ET
FCS
FDA
FES
FF
FPB
ft/sec
GAPS
GAS
GBA
Equipment for Controlled Liquid Phase Sintering Experiment-Spacehab
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Emergency Shutdown
Earth Observation System
electrical power distribution and control subsystem
eastern standard time
External Tank
flight control system
fault detection annunciation
flash evaporator system
free flyer
fuel preburner
feet per second
group activation packs
Getaway Special
Getaway Special Bridge Assembly
B-1
GEl
GFE
GGVM
GH2
G.m.t.
gAINS
HIU
HPFTP
HPOTP
ICD
ICOM
IFM
IMMUNE-
01
IMU
I/O
Isp
JSC
keas
KSC
kW
kwh
ibm
LCC
LESC
lu_e
MBE
MDM
MECO
MET
Mir
MPM
MPS
MSFC
NASA
nmi.
NPSP
NSTS
ground environment instrumentation
Government furnished equipment
gas generator valve module
gaseous hydrogen
Greenwich mean time
gaseous nitrogen
general purpose computer
High Accuracy Inertial Navigation System
headset interface unit
high pressure fuel turbopump
high pressure oxidizer turbopump
Interface Control Drawing
intercommunications
in-flight maintenance
Immunology Experiment-Of
inertial measurement unit
input/output
specific impulse
Johnson Space Center
knots equivalent air speed
Kennedy Space Center
kilowatt
kilowatt hours
pound mass
Launch Commit Criteria
Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company
liquid hydrogen
liquid oxygen
lubrication
Molecular Beam Epitaxy
multiplexer/demultiplexer
main engine cutoff
mission elapsed time
Russian Space Station
manipulator positioning mechanism
main propulsion system
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
nautical mile
net positive suction pressure
National Space Transportation System
ODERACS Orbital Debris Radar Calibration Spheres
OF
OFI
OMRSD
OMS
ON
ORSEP
PADM
PAO
PAL
PCMMU
PDI
operational forward
operational flight instrumentation
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
orbital maneuvering subsystem
Op tokine tics Nys tagmus
Organic Separation
portable audio data modem
Public Affairs Office
protuberance air load
pulse code modulation master unit
payload data interleaver
B-2
PDU
PGSC
PMBT
ppm
PRSD
PSB
RCC
RCS
RF
RHEED
RM
RMS
RSRM
RSB
S&A
SAMS
SAREX
SC-2
SEF
SLF
s/n
SOR/F
SOYUZ
SRB
SRE
SRSS
SSME
STI
STS
TCS
TEPC
TIPS
TPS
VHM
WCS
WSB
WSF/
power drive unit
Payload General Support Computer
propellant mean bulk temperature
parts per million
power reactant storage and distribution
Pennsylvania State Biomodule
reusable carbon carbon
reaction control subsystem
radio frequency
Reflection High Energy Election Diffraction
redundancy management
remote manipulator system
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
rudder speedbrake
safe and arm
Space Acceleration Measurement System
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment
spacecraft-2 computer
Space Experiment Facility
Shuttle Landing Facility
serial number
Stirling Orbiter Refrigerator/Freezer
Russian spacecraft
Solid Rocket Booster
Sample Return Experiment
Shuttle Range Safety System
Space Shuttle main engine
Shuttle Thermal Imager
Space Transportation System
Thermal Control System
Tissue Equivalent Proportional Counter
Thermal Impulse Printer System
thermal protection subsystem
voluntary head movements
Waste Collection System
water spray boiler
WSF-I Wake Shield Facility
B-3
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